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NOTES AND COMMENTS
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harsh in view of the degree of the invasion of privacy involved."' 3 However, it should be noted that if an alternative method for dealing with
violations of the fourth amendment is to be formulated, it must come
from the legislature."0'

In regard to suppression of evidence, neither the approach taken in
Bennett nor that taken in Vader is consistent with fourth amendment
precedent. The administrative search view of Bennett is not easily reconciled with the fact that the objective of the search in that case was to ferret
out evidence of the crime of arson. Moreover, even if the Bennett
approach is given credence, it must be realized that the Camarav. Municipal Court decision, by abolishing the civil-criminal distinction, impliedly
extends the exclusionary rule to evidence obtained from constitutionally

forbidden administrative searches. The "habitability" test set out in
Vader for determining when the individual is entitled to fourth amendment protection (vis-a-vis his home) is inadequate for the task. It also
conflicts with the current test laid down in Katz v. United States.

Therefore, when future courts encounter search and seizure problems
similar to those involved in Bennett and Vader, they should view these
cases not so much as logical extensions of fourth amendment doctrine,
but as aberrations from it.
JAMES MARSHALL COSTAN

THE SCOPE OF COVERAGE UNDER THE FAIR
LABOR STANDARDS ACT OF 1938
The Fair Labor Standards Act,' enacted in 1938, is an effort on the
' See, e.g., Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443 (1971); Wright, Must the
Criminal Go Free if the Constable Blunders?, 50 TEXAS L. REv. 736, 741-45 (1972).
"'0 Bivens v. Six Unknown Fed. Narcotics Agents, 403 U.S. 388, 411-27 (1971) (Burger,
C.J., dissenting). In this vigorous dissent Chief Justice Burger attacks the exclusionary rule
as an unfeasible remedy for violations of fourth amendment protections by government
officials. The Chief Justice emphasizes that the rule has done little to deter unreasonable
searches, and it extracts too high a price from society's interest in law enforcement for the
protection that it does supply. Id. at 413-16. As an alternative to the exclusionary rule the
Chief Justice sets forth in specific terms a statutory remedy for violations of the fourth
amendment by government officials. Id. at 422-23. It should be recognized that Chief
Justice Burger is not alone in his criticism. For other attacks on the rule, see materials cited
in appendix to Chief Justice Burger's Bivens dissent. Id. at 426-27; Horowitz, Excluding
the Exclusionary Rule-Can There Be An Effective Alternative?, 47 L.A. BAR BULL. 91
(1972); Wright, Must the CriminalGo Free if the Constable Blunders?, 50 TEXAS L. REv.
736 (1972).
129 U.S.C. §§ 201-19 (1970).
The Fair Labor Standards Act was intended primarily to aid in ending the Depression.
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part of Congress to maintain federal minimum wage 2 and overtime pay
standards3 for employees involved in interstate commerce. As the Act is
now structured,4 employers are subject to its provisions only if they operate an "enterprise engaged in commerce or in the production of goods
for commerce."' Situations have arisen, however, where it is difficult to
The minimum wage provisions were included to insure a basic standard of living for covered
employees, while the overtime pay provisions were enacted to encourage employers to hire
more employees rather than work current employees excessive hours. Congress invoked its
plenary commerce power to pass the measure on the theory that perpetuation of less than
minimum wages and inferior labor conditions hampered interstate commerce and movement of goods within such commerce.
In 1949 the Fair Labor Standards Act was revised. Certain employees previously
covered were removed from the scope of the Act on the notion that their involvement with
interstate commerce was not sufficient to justify coverage. The original standard of "engaging. . . in any occupation necessary to production of goods for commerce" was restricted
to include only employees engaged in operations "closely related" and "directly essential"
to the production of such goods. Other revisions in 1949 included a higher minimum wage,
as well as amendments, necessitated by the new wage standard, to maintain a balanced
economy. In an effort to strengthen enforcement of the Act, authority was given to the
government to force payment of back wages.
In 1961, the "enterprise amendments" were added to the Act to enlarge the basis for
coverage. Prior to 1961, an individual employee was subject to coverage strictly on the basis
of his personal relationship with interstate commerce. The effect of the "enterprise amendments" was to bring within the terms of the Act all employees of any "enterprise" having
at least one employee so involved in interstate commerce.
In 1966, the Act was again substantially amended. Enterprise coverage was extended
to non-profit activities in competition with similar operations conducted for a business
purpose. At the same time, the minimum sales requirement for retail and service enterprises
was lowered from one million to five hundred thousand dollars annual gross volume of sales.
See generally H. WECHT, WAGE-HOUR LAW-COVERAGE (Supp. 1961).
'The minimum wage provision of the Act stipulates that:
(a) Every employer shall pay to each of his employees who in any
workweek is engaged in commerce or in the production of goods for
commerce, or is employed in an enterprise engaged in commerce or in the
production of goods for commerce [minimum wages] ....
29 U.S.C. § 206 (1970).
3
The maximum hours section begins as follows:
(a) (1) Except as otherwise provided in this section, no employer
shall employ any of his employees who in any workweek is engaged in
commerce or in the production of goods for commerce, or is employed in
an enterprise engaged in commerce or in the production of goods for
commerce, for a workweek longer than forty hours unless such employee
receives [overtime pay] . ...
29 U.S.C. § 207 (1970).
'For a discussion of how the Fair Labor Standards Act has evolved to its present form
see note I supra.
5
The Act provides this definition of the phrase:
(s) "Enterprise engaged in commerce or in the production of goods
for commerce" means an enterprise which has employees engaged in commerce or in the production of goods for commerce, including employees
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determine if an employer has employees "engaged in commerce or in the
production of goods for commerce," within the meaning of the Act.
The Fifth Circuit recently dealt with this question in Hodgson v.
Travis-Edwards,Inc.6 In this case, coverage was sought for employees of

a local office building leased to a variety of tenants.7 The court held that

all the employees who performed duties incidental to the operation of the

building were covered under the "enterprise" provisions' of the Act as a
result of certain activities of clerical employees. These clerical workers
prepared and mailed reports out-of-state to officers and shareholders of
Travis-Edwards, Inc., the owner of the office building. The court found
that in handling the reports, the office employees were "engaged in commerce or in the production of goods for commerce."' Coverage was
therefore extended to the other employees, through the enterprise provisions of the Act since the activity of the clerical workers in interstate
commerce resulted in the operation of the office building becoming a
"covered enterprise."'"

In 1968, the Third Circuit in Stevens v. Welcome Wagon International, Inc." reached a different result in a closely related situation. Here,
handling, selling or otherwise working on goods that have been moved in
or produced for commerce ...
29 U.S.C. § 203(s) (1970).
'68 CCH LAB. CAS. 1 32,726 (5th Cir. 1972) (hereinafter Travis-Edwards).
rThe number and variety of tenants is an important variable in wage and hour litigation. In a case in which petitioner owned and managed a 48-story office building with more
than a hundred tenants, and in which no manufacturing occurred, the Supreme Court has
held:
Renting office space in a building exclusively set aside for an unrestricted
variety of office work spontaneously satisfies the common understanding
of what is local business and makes the employees of such a building
engaged in local business.
10 East 40th Street Bldg., Inc. v. Callus, 325 U.S. 578, 583 (1945) (hereinafter Callus).
In contrast, Borden v. Borella, 325 U.S. 679 (1945), (decided the same day as Callus)
held that the employees of a manufacturing company which operated an office building and
occupied 58% of the premises were found to be covered by the Act. In Callus the Court
said that the difference between these two situations was that "Running an office building
as an entirely independent enterprise is too many steps removed from the physical process
of the production of goods." 325 U.S. at 583.
See note I supra.
'68 CCH LAa. CAS. %32,726, at 45,466.
'lid. at 45,465.
"390 F.2d 75 (3rd Cir. 1968) (hereinafter Welcome Wagon).
In this case, a woman sued her former employer to recover allegedly due back wages.
This procedure should be distinguished from that used in Travis-Edwards.There, the action
was brought by the Secretary of Labor seeking to enjoin the employer from withholding
past minimum wages and overtime pay. These procedures represent the two methods for
bringing a cause of action under the Fair Labor Standards Act as provided in 29 U.S.C.
§§ 216, 217 (1970). Once the Secretary initiates injunction proceedings, the employee is
precluded from bringing his own action.
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a woman employed by Welcome Wagon International, Inc. solicited advertising contracts from merchants in her area. These contracts called for
the woman to distribute products of the local merchants to new residents
and certain other people within the community. The employee claimed
coverage on the basis of daily, weekly, and monthly reports and occasional contracts with merchants which she mailed out-of-state to her
employer. The court concluded that the employee conducted an independent local activity and that her work was in effect an "establishment"'"
within itself, thus qualifying for an exclusion 3 from the enterprise provisions of the Act. The court specifically held that the regular mailing of
the reports to Welcome Wagon International, Inc. was insufficient to
create liability for the employer under the Fair Labor Standards Act. 4
Thus, there appears to be a difference of opinion between the Fifth and
Third Circuits as to the consequence of the use of the mails as a basis
for finding coverage under the Act.
In an effort to determine which is the better reasoned conception of
coverage on the basis of preparing and mailing reports, it is necessary to
go beyond the specific terms of the Act. A precise statement of what is
included within the scope of "engaging in commerce or the production
of goods for commerce" would be quite difficult to set forth. A plausible
standard must be extracted from other sources and cases involving similar
issues.
An initial consideration in determining the scope of "engaging in
commerce or the production of goods for commerce" is the fact that in
selecting the phrase, Congress invoked less than its full constitutional
power in the area of commerce regulation. The decision of Congress not
'"The term "establishment" is not specifically defined in the Act, but authority for its
meaning is found in the Administrator's Interpretive Bulletin:
[Tihe term "establishment" . . . refers to a "distinct physical place of
business" rather than to "an entire business or enterprise" which may
include several separate places of business.
29 C.F.R. § 779.23 (1972).
In Welcome Wagon, the employee fell within the establishment exception to enterprise
coverage. See note 13 infra. Section 4 of the Act, 29 U.S.C. § 204 (1970), provides for the
establishment of an Administrator to head the Wage and Hour Division within the Department of Labor. Among the duties the Administrator has assumed under the Act is the
establishment of interpretive guidelines. These guidelines are intended to indicate to employers what enforcement policy the Wage and Hour Division will pursue in administering the
Act. See note 43 infra.
3
The exception for a separate establishment is provided as follows:
Any establishment which has as its only regular employee the owner
thereof. . . shall not be considered to be an enterprise engaged in commerce or in the production of goods for commerce or a part of such an
enterprise . . ..
29 U.S.C. § 203(s) (1970).
"390 F.2d at 78. See text accompanying note 48 infra.
15The fact that Congress invoked less than its full plenary power in the Fair Labor
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to exercise its full constitutional power may have stemmed from a wish
not to interfere with primarily intrastate commerce."6 The Supreme Court
in Mitchell v. H.B. Zachry Co. 17 made note of the proposition

that limits on coverage cannot be understood merely in terms of
the social consequences of the Act, in light of which any limitations must appear inconsistent. For the Act also manifests the
competing concern of Congress to avoid undue displacement of
state regulation of activities of a dominantly local character."8
Though concededly Congress did not go as far as it could have in establishing coverage, it is not clear exactly how far Congress did go in this
effort to regulate interstate commerce. Decisions involving the extent of
coverage often have stressed the importance of weighing each case on its

particular facts.' 9
The legislative history of the Act provides insight into the selection
of the "engaging in commerce or the production of goods for commerce"
standard for coverage. Initially, the Senate passed a wage and hour bill2
with the "engaging in commerce or in the production of goods for comStandards Act is pointed out in the Senate Report on the 1961 amendments:
The committee bill, like the original act, relies on engagement in "commerce" or in the "production of goods for commerce" to establish a firm
constitutional base for the legislation under the commerce power. Over 20
years ago, in United States v. Darby, 61 S. Ct. 451, 312 U.S. 100, the
constitutionality of this approach to federal regulation of wages and hours
was thoroughly considered and affirmatively settled by the Supreme
Court, which has made it abundantly clearthat this act involves considerably less than a full exercise of the constitutionalpower.
S. REP. No. 145, 87th Cong., 1st Sess. 42 (1961) (emphasis added).
"Much of the debate surrounding the enactment of the Fair Labor Standards Act
related to the issue of whether the Act would be a violation of states' rights. Thus, the
decision to invoke less than full regulation of commerce power appears to have arisen from
such disagreement.
It cannot be assumed that when Congress enacts a new kind of federal
legislation it covers all the situations which may possibly be encompassed
within the evils responsible for such legislation. This may be so where the
evil sought to be remedied is the concern of only a single unitary government, but it is not so where the underlying assumptions of our dual form
of government cut across whiat might be the implied range of the legislation. It is a long-settled principle that Congress may elect to control only
part of what it can constitutionally control, leaving local matters for the
States.
H. WECHT, WAGE-HOUR LAw-CovERAGE 262-63 (1951).
'7362 U.S. 310 (1960).
"Id. at 316.
"Mitchell v. H.B. Zachry Co., 362 U.S. 310 (1960); Kirschbaum Co. v. Walling, 316
U.S. 517 (1942); Wirtz v. Wohl Shoe Co., 382 F.2d 848 (5th Cir. 1967); Wirtz v. Ferguson,
317 F.2d 343 (5th Cir. 1963).
"S. 2475, 75th Cong., 3rd Sess. (1938).
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merce" standard of coverage. The House Committee on Labor substantially revised the Senate bill,"' including among its proposed changes a
standard providing coverage when the "employer is engaged in an industry affecting commerce.""2 A compromise measure23 was adopted in a
joint conference of the House and Senate, with adoption of "engaging in
commerce or in the production of goods for commerce" as the basis for
2

coverage.

The difference in the standards of coverage proposed by the House
and Senate appears to have been related to the different methods of administration suggested by each. The Senate bill originally provided for
the creation of a 'Labor Standards Board with five members, to be selected by the President with the Senate's approval. 26 In the House revisions, administration was to be conducted by the Secretary of Labor
under House-established guidelines providing that the Secretary would
determine if an industry "affected commerce." 6 In an apparent compromise, the Conference agreement provided for a Wage and Hour
Division within the Department of Labor. To head the Wage and Hour
Division and direct its operation, an administrator was to be selected by
the President.27
21

H.R. REP. No. 2182,75th Cong., 3rd Sess. (1938) (hereinafter H.R. REP. No. 2182).

21d. at 2.

2H.R. REP. No. 2738, 75th Cong., 3rd Sess. (1938) (hereinafter H.R. RaP. No. 2738).
24

1d. at 29.
21ld. at 15.

"The House measure provided for an elaborate method of administration, allowing a
great deal of discretion to the Secretary of Labor in determining coverage:
Section 6 of the committee amendment directs the Secretary, as soon as
practicable after the enactment of the act, to determine the relation of the
various industries to commerce .

. .

. If in the case of any industry the

Secretary finds that the activities of the industry are nationwide in their
scope, as that the industry is dependent for its existence upon substantial
purchases or sales of goods in commerce and upon transportation in commerce, or that the relation of the industry to commerce is in other respects
close and substantial, the Secretary is required to issue an order declaring
the industry to be an industry affecting commerce.
H.R. REP. No. 2182 at 9.
As discussed above, this interpretation of "affecting commerce" has substantially the
same force as the more restricted concept of "engaging in commerce or in the production
of goods for commerce." Thus, the' House likely did not intend to exercise its full plenary
commerce power, despite the use of the "affecting commerce" language. However, had
the "affecting commerce" standard been invoked, it is quite possible that the courts would
have established a broader range of coverage on the theory that the "plain meaning" of
affecting commerce precludes any evidence of a contrary meaning in the legislative history
of the Act.
2The committee report gives only cursory treatment to its decision on the question of
administration and disposes of it in one paragraph:
As the conference agreement provides for a limited degree of flexibility
in the application of minimum wage rates, it was impossible to avoid the
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It is likely that the Committee chose the "engaging in commerce or
the production of goods for commerce" standard as a consequence of the
scheme of administration selected.21 A Wage and Hour Division headed
by an administrator 29 was more like the Senate-proposed Labor Standards Board than the procedure under the Secretary of Labor stipulated
in the House amendment. Thus, in following the general administrative
structure proposed by the Senate, the Committee may well have elected
to also adopt the Senate bill's language regarding coverage.
The disagreement over administration and the scope of coverage
seems to have emanated to some extent from sectional differences. The
House measure appears broader in application and administration than
the committee agreement. Hearings on the floor of the Senate indicate
that many Southern senators felt that any wage and hour legislation was
unconstitutional, and efforts to prevent passage emphasized this theme."0
In an effort to appease critics of the bill, supporters attempted to tone
down the range of the Act's coverage. In response to questioning concerning the scope of the Act's coverage, Senator Pepper of Florida said:
I want it distinctly stated that this proposed law is not applicable
to all employees of an industry which itself is engaged in interstate
creation of some administrative machinery to administer the Act. Section
4 of the conference agreement provides for the creation of a Wage and
Hour Division in the Department of Labor, under the direction of an
Administrator to be appointed by the President with the advice of the

Senate.
H.R. REP. No. 2738 at 29.
INo mention is made in the committee report of the selection of this basis for coverage.
The only acknowledgement of any difference regarding coverage was that:
Section 6 of the Conference Agreement provides for the establishment of
minimum wages for employees engaged in commerce or in the production
of goods for commerce. The House amendment provided for the establishment of minimum wages if the employer was engaged in commerce or in
any industry affecting commerce.
Id. Thus, the choice of terms which the courts have emphasized so frequently was passed
over summarily by the committee report. The inference might be that the committee did
not consider one phrase to be much different in scope from the other, since as used in House
Report 2182, "affecting commerce" was not intended to be as broad in scope as the
standard of "affecting commerce" is used to characterize a full exercise of Congress'
plenary power to regulate commerce. See note 26 supra.
"See note 12 supra.
"Debates on the Senate floor before passage of the committee bill included discussion
of particular examples to indicate the scope of coverage. Senator Bailey of North Carolina
felt that the bill reached beyond the power of Congress:
The mere fact that there could be a dispute between me as a worker and
someone else as an employer as to how many hours I should work or how
much I should be paid would in itself not raise up the exercise of the
plenary power of the Congress to regulate all the industry.
83 CONG. REc. 9168 (1938) (remarks of Senator Bailey).
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commerce. It is applicable only to those employees who themselves are engaged either in interstate commerce or the production
of goods for interstate commerce, and the contrary theory was
definitely rejected by the committee. 3'
While the argument that passage would be an imposition on states'
rights may have seemed valid to many, the probable attitude of the public
during the Depression toward an act providing such economic relief likely
foreclosed much vocal dissension with respect to its passage. From a
political point of view, only those most secure in their offices were likely
to chance criticizing the bill, 32 and even they had to be careful in their
choice of words.3 3 On the other hand, some industries which might have
been compelled to comply with the terms of the Act appear to have been
successful in lobbying so as to receive favorable treatment from its terms.
In an effort to secure passage of the bill, supporters seem to have made
concessions to certain groups, most notably the agricultural bloc,34 in
return for support of the bill's enactment.
The legislative history indicates that concessions to opponents of a
federal wage-hour law was a primary reason for the limitation in coverage
of the Act. While a less than full exercise of Congress' plenary commerce
power was intended, any discussion of a definite meaning of "engaging
in commerce or in the production of goods for commerce" is ignored in
the reports on the bill. Supporters of the bill may have elected not to raise
31

ld. (remarks of Senator Pepper). As a result of the Enterprise Amendments of 1961,
Senator Pepper's declaration is no longer accurate. See note 1 supra.
32
To indicate public feeling toward the enactment of federal wage-hour law, pertinent
comments were entered in the Congressional Record. Among these was the following
excerpt from a newspaper article: "The new wage and hour bill continues to agitate Congress and country. Both parties' treatment of it gives more evidence of temporary political
maneuvering than of hopeful humanitarian reform." Wages of Recovery, Chris. Sci. Mon.,
May 18, 1938, cited in 83 CONG. REc. at 7304 (1938).
"Even Senator Bailey, an outspoken critic of the bill, conceded that the objective of
the bill was a worthy one: "I am arguing now wholly on the constitutional ground as to the
power of Congress, not the humanity of a wage." 83 CONG. REC.9171 (1938) (remarks of
Senator Bailey).
"The extensive list of exemptions found in Section 13 of the Act, 29 U.S.C. § 213
(1970), may be indicative of some of the concessions made to gain support. There was some
bitterness toward the incompleteness of coverage, as indicated by New Jersey Representative Hartley's statement:
Political expediency rather than relief for the exploited workers of America has dictated the terms of this bill. We are told that this measure will
raise the wages and lower the working hours of the exploited workers of
America. If that is the case then why is it that the poorest paid labor of
all, the farm labor, whose weekly average for 1937 was $4.76 has been
omitted from this bill? The answer is that the votes of the farm bloc in
the House, the best organized bloc we have here, would have voted against
the bill and defeated it.
Id. at 9257 (remarks of Representative Hartley).
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the issue of the scope of the phrase, feeling that such a question would
further slow passage. Economic relief was the main objective of those
backing the bill, and in order to facilitate passage, its supporters may
have been willing to allow the courts to determine the precise scope of
the "engaging in commerce or in the production of goods for commerce"
standard.
With this inexplicit statutory language and legislative history in the
background, the Fifth Circuit in Travis-Edwards determined that by preparing and mailing reports to out-of-state shareholders and officers, the
office workers were "engaged in commerce or in the production of goods
for commerce."35 The phrase encompasses two tests for coverage," and
the court presented a theory for coverage under each test, implying that
the single activity of preparing and mailing the reports would qualify
under either test for coverage. In ruling that the Act applied to these
office workers, the court seems to have gone beyond the limitations which
other courts have established in applying the two tests of "engaging in
commerce or the production of goods for commerce."
Engaging in Commerce
"Commerce" under the Act means "transmission, or communication
among the several states."37 Arguably, in preparing and mailing reports,
the employees of Travis-Edwards were involved in "transmission" of
information of "communication among the several states." The terms
"communication" and "transmission," however, are words of art in this
legislation and thus are not subject to broad characterization. An examination of other authorities, therefore, is necessary to determine whether
the Fifth Circuit properly construed the statutory language.
u68 CCH LAB. CAS.
32,726, at 45,466.
'A Fifth Circuit office building decision has distinguished the two tests for coverage:
[I]t is our clear understanding that the courts had established a different
and much narrower standard for "in commerce" coverage than for the
"production of goods for commerce" coverage.
The Fair Labor Standards Act makes a distinction between employees engaged in commerce, and in the production of goods for commerce.
By Section 3() of the Act,.29 U.S.C.A. § 2036), reference is made to

those engaged in the production of goods for commerce, and in such
definition includes any "process or occupation directly essential to the

production thereof, in any State." "Commerce" on the other hand, is
narrowly limited in § 3(b), 29 U.S.C.A. § 203(b) to "trade, commerce,

transportation, transmission, or communication among the several states
or between any State and any place outside thereof." It is apparent that

the two definitions are not synonymous and that a sound basis exists in
the statute for applying a different standard to each of these two phases
of coverage.

Tobin v. Girard Properties, Inc., 206 F.2d 524, 526-27 (5th Cir. 1953).
-29 U.S.C. § 203(b) (1970).
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One such authority is the interpretive statement concerning the general coverage s of the Act, promulgated by the Wage and Hour Administrator.3 9 This interpretive guideline indicates a broad range of coverage
within the phrase "engaging in commerce,"" with coverage established
merely on the basis of regular recurrence of an activity involving interstate commerce. The guideline states that the amount of such activity is
insignificant, stressing only the element of regularity;4 the Fifth Circuit
in Travis-Edwardsand other cases cited therein4" adopted this position.
Courts, however, are not bound by statements of the Wage and Hour
Administrator, since the statements are not regarded as controlling authority in interpreting the Act.4 3 Thus, a Georgia court44 repudiated the
-29 C.F.R. § 776 (1972).
"See note 12 supra.
4029 C.F.R. § 776.10(b) (1972), which states:
[I]f the employee, as a regular and recurrent part of his duties, uses such
instrumentalities [mail and other channels of communication] in obtaining
or communicating information . . . or messages, or . . .plans or other

documents across State lines, he comes within the scope of the Act as an
employee directly engaged in the work of "communication" between the
State and places outside the State.
"There are a number of decisions that point to regularity of activity in commerce to
find coverage, and the Administrator apparently relied on these holdings:
[T]he law is settled that every employee whose engagement in activities
in commerce or in production of goods for commerce, even though small
in amount, is regular and recurrent, is covered by the "act."
29 C.F.R. § 776.3 (1972).
4268 CCH LAB. CAs. 32,726, at 45,466.
The decision here cites two other Fifth Circuit decisions that relied on a regular
involvement with interstate commerce, disregarding the small relation the activity had to
the total scope of the employees' duties. In Shultz v. Kip's Big Boy, 431 F.2d 530 (5th Cir.
1970), the Fifth Circuit ruled that employees who spent most of their time preparing food
were covered, where these employees spent about ten hours a month handling goods that
had moved in interstate commerce. In Montalvo v. Tower Life Bldg:, 426 F.2d 1135 (5th
Cir. 1970), employees of an insurance company who spent a small part of their time each
day receiving premium checks and mailing claim checks were held to be covered.
'The Supreme Court discussed the relevance of interpretive bulletins in an early wagehour case where the bulletin was used in an effort to find coverage.
There is no statutory provisions as to what, if any, deference courts
should pay to the Administrator's conclusions . .

.

.They are not, of

course, conclusive, even in the cases with which they directly deal, much
less in those to which they apply only by analogy . ...
We consider that the rulings, interpretations and opinions of the
Administrator under this Act, while not controlling upon the courts by
reason of their authority, do constitute a body of experience and informed
judgment to which courts and litigants may properly resort for guidance.
Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 139 (1944).
"Yearty v. General Wholesale Co., 88 Ga. App. 399, 76 S.E.2d 715 (1953).
It is noteworthy that state court decisions under the Fair Labor Standards Act are
relatively uncommon, for most complaints are brought in federal district courts, either by
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Administrator's position:
Contrary to the Administrator's holding in the above-quoted bulletin, we do not think the Supreme Court's pronouncement...
that the test of an employee's coverage by the act is whether a
substantial part of his employment activities relates to goods in
commerce or produced for commerce completely excludes the consideration of "the percentage, volume, or amount of activities of
either employee or employer" in arriving at the answer of whether
the employee's activities are substantial . .

..

The quoted language indicates that the amount of the employee's time
spent "engaging in commerce" in relation to the total number of hours
worked is a consideration in establishing coverage. Had the Fifth Circuit
followed this standard, it would have been necessary to ascertain how
much time the office employees spent in compiling and mailing the reports each month.
The regularity of the employee's activity, emphasized as controlling
by the Wage and Hour Division and the Fifth Circuit, is not accepted
as the sole test in all jurisdictions." The Third Circuit in Welcome
Wagon, though noting the regular submission of reports by the employee, 7 stressed that the "appellant's activities were local in nature regardless of her postal communications with appellee's New York City
and Memphis offices."4 The employee in Welcome Wagon was primarily
engaged in soliciting local advertising, and the Third Circuit determined
that the regular submission of reports to Welcome Wagon International,
Inc. was not sufficiently significant in relation to the scope of her duties
to qualify her for coverage.
The Third Circuit followed a similar line of reasoning in a 1947
decision.49 In that case the employee's duties involved issuing work orders
and mailing them to subcontractors, many of whom resided out-of-state.
The employee attempted to establish coverage on the basis of his use of
employees or the Secretary of Labor. However, under Section 16 of the Act an action to
recover unpaid minimum wages and overtime pay "may be maintained in any court of
competent jurisdiction by any one or more employees. . . ." 29 U.S.C. § 216(b) (1970).
OThe "Administrator's holding" referred to by the court still reflects the position of
the Wage and Hour Division on this subject. The language is identical to the statement
appearing in note 42 supra. 88 Ga. App. at 401, 76 S.E.2d at 717.
"See text accompanying note 48 infra.

"The decision mentioned that the reports were sent on a daily, weekly, and monthly
basis but did not emphasize this regularity. The court simply pointed out that the reports

were only insignificantly related to the scope of the employee's duties and the employer's
business. 390 F.2d at 77, citing Mitchell v. Welcome Wagon, Inc., 139 F. Supp. 674 (W.D.
Tenn. 1954), affd per curiam, 232 F.2d 892 (6th Cir. 1956).

"390 F.2d at 78.
"Kelly v. Ford, Bacon & Davis, Inc., 162 F.2d 555 (3rd Cir. 1947).
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the mails to send the work orders out-of-state. The Third Circuit ruled
that this use of the mails was insufficient to qualify the employee for
coverage under the Act:
What he did remotely affected commerce, but the gap between the
primary intrastate operation [of the employer] and the collateral
interstate commerce feature was not bridged for any practical
purposes by the processing and mailing of the letters which appear
in this matter. ....
50
Thus, the Third Circuit appears to maintain that the insubstantial though
regular use of the mails to send correspondence out-of-state is insufficient, by itself, to qualify an employee for coverage under the Act.
In addition to the tests of "regularity" and "volume of interstate
activity," a third test for establishing coverage under the "engaging in
commerce" standard has been set forth in decisions 5l of the Eighth and
Tenth Circuits. Under this approach, the facility to commerce test, the
employee is covered by the Act if the termination of his duties would
seriously disturb commerce. Conversely, if the withdrawal of the employee's services has little effect on interstate commerce, such lack of
consequence is considered indicative that the employee is not "engaged
2
in commerce.

In New Mexico Public Service Co. v. Engel,5 3 an employee of an
electricity distributor sought coverage because a portion of his employer's
customers were engaged in interstate commerce. The court ruled for the
employee, feeling that his function in the employer's business was required for the efficient operation of this enterprise engaged in commerce. 54 The court reasoned:
If a cessation of the services of the employee causes an interruption or interference with the free movement of commerce, it is
ordinarily regarded as an essential and indispensable part
thereof. 5
OId. at 561.
51
Republic Pictures Corp. v. Kappler, 151 F.2d 543 (8th Cir. 1945); New Mexico Public
Service Co. v. Engel, 145 F.2d 636 (10th Cir. 1944) (hereinafter New Mexico Public Service
Co.). 2
' Republic Pictures Corp. v. Kappler, 151 F.2d 543 (8th Cir. 1945). Here the employee's duties involved receiving motion pictures from his employer, arranging for their
showing in the local area, and forwarding the pictures so that they might be shown in
another area. The court, in holding that the employee was covered by the Act, announced
its test: "The practical test to be applied is whether, without the particular service, interstate
commerce would be impeded or abated." Id. at 454.
0145 F.2d 636 (10th Cir. 1944).
"1d.at 638.
5Id.
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In 1955, subsequent to the Eighth and Tenth Circuit opinions, a Supreme Court decision restricted the facility-to-commerce standard, requiring instead that the activity of the employee be a vital element of
interstate commerce, without considering the effect of terminating the
employee's service. In Mitchell v. Vollmer," Mr. Justice Douglas, speaking for the Court, posed the following test for determining coverage:
The test [of whether an employee is engaged "in commerce"] is
whether the work is so directly and vitally related to the functioning of an instrumentality or facility of interstate commerce as to
be, in practical
effect, a part of it, rather than isolated, local
7
activity.
Under this Supreme Court test, which appears to restrict the test in
New Mexico Public Service Co., the office workers in Travis-Edwards
would not qualify for coverage. The operation of a local office building
is not an "instrumentality or facility of interstate commerce"" to which
the office workers could be "directly and vitally related" as a result of
preparing and mailing the reports. Other cases involving local office
buildings do not mention any use of the mails as a possible basis for
coverage. Moreover, it is unlikely that the mails are an instrumentality
of commerce as contemplated in the Supreme Court test. The reports in
question are actually no more than consolidations of various accounting
data used by the corporation and appear to be sent to the shareholders
and officers to keep them generally apprised of the status of their investment. The building, in all likelihood, would continue to operate without
the reports, the only real effect of stopping the reports being that the
officers and shareholders would have to come to Shreveport if they
wished to examine the books. It is doubtful that the Supreme Court
would find such a consequence sufficient to establish that the activity of
the office employees is "directly and vitally" essential to the conduct of
interstate commerce.
Production of Goods for Commerce
Aside from "engaging in commerce," the Fifth Circuit in TravisEdwards presented an argument that the office workers were also "engaged

. . .

in the production of goods for commerce" as a result of their

efforts in preparing the reports. Drawing from the definitions section" of
the Act, one may advance an argument for coverage on this basis. The
definition of "produced" includes within its terms, "handled, or in any
-349 U.S. 427 (1955).

51Id. at 429.
-"Seenote 7 supra.
5929 U.S.C. § 203 (1970).
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manner worked on." 6 The expression "goods" within the Act refers in
part to "articles or subjects of commerce of any character.'", The office
employees indisputably "handled" the reports. Thus, the central question
is whether the reports are "articles or subjects of commerce."
There is disagreement as to whether an article without intrinsic value
may be termed a "good" for purposes of the Act. The reports in TravisEdwards had no commercial value in the market place, yet the court took
the view that the intrinsic value in the reports themselves was not required
' 62
within the meaning of "goods.
The court in Welcome Wagon determined that the reports mailed outof-state were not "goods" within the meaning of the Act in the absence
of intrinsic value, citing Mitchell v. Welcome Wagon, Inc.:13
The communications with Defendant's divisional offices, including
the rare transmittal of the executory service contracts, are purely
internal, and like the confidential daily reports sent to the subscribers, are incidental to the local services performed by the employee. The records, reports and the service contracts have no
value of their own. They are not Defendant's objective and Defendant does not sell them as goods. Their preparation and transmission incident to a business whose purpose does not comprise the
production of goods at all, does not constitute engaging in the
production of "goods." 4
Relying on this theory, the Third Circuit held in Welcome Wagon that it
could not accept the employee's position that she was engaged in the
production of "goods." 65
An earlier decision distinguishing items on the basis of value for the
purpose of coverage, Bozant v. Bank of New York,"6 held that employees
of a bank were subject to the provisions of the Act as a result of mailing
various forms of commercial paper out-of-state. The court noted that
such a conclusion would not have been reached had the only correspondence been letters and other papers with no inherent value.67 Here, the
-29 U.S.C. § 2036) (1970).
6629 U.S.C. § 203Ji) (1970).
6268 CCH LAB. CAS. 1 32,726, at 45,466.
1139 F. Supp..674 (W.D. Tenn. 1954), affdper curiam, 232 F.2d 892 (6th Cir. 1956).
The facts and situation in this case are practically identical to the facts in Welcome Wagon
(see text accompanying note 12 supra), and the Third Circuit relied quite heavily on language from this district court case to support its decision.
64139 F. Supp. at 679, cited in 390 F.2d at 77-78.

65390 F.2d at 78.
66156 F.2d 787 (2nd Cir. 1946).
6

The court indicated that the inclusion of letters within the concept of "goods" would
overstep the reach of the Act:
[I]t would be unreasonable to the last degree to suppose that Congress
31
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Second Circuit appeared to share the view expressed in Welcome Wagon
that the concept of a "good" required more than an item with a general
business purpose, indicating the need for a particular article to have
commercial value.
The Fifth Circuit in Travis-Edwardscited Shultz v. Falk" as authority
for its position that no intrinsic value is required to classify an item as a
"good" under the Act. In Falk, the employer managed apartment buildings for their owners, many of whom lived out-of-state. The holding was
based on the fact that the business of managing apartment buildings
included mailing insurance policies and various reports to the out-of-state
69

owners.
This is not quite the same situation as was present in Travis-Edwards,
however. The employees in Falk were not mailing items strictly of an
intracorporate nature, for the correspondence was with customers of their
employer, not the employer himself. As such, they were essential items

in providing satisfactory service to the owners of these buildings. Moreover, insurance policies may be used for commercial purposes, while reports mailed by the office employees in Travis-Edwardshave no value of
their own.
The test adopted in Travis-Edwardsto determine coverage under the

"production of goods" standard appears to depart from the judicially

70
accepted notion of "goods" as "articles or subjects of commerce."

meant to cover such incidents of a business whose purpose did not comprise the production of "goods" at all. Indeed, were it otherwise, the Act
would sweep into its maw every business, however local, which manufactured nothing whatever, merely because it was carried on by correspondence, which is the case with all business ....
• . .In so far as the Bank's business consists of preparing, executing
or validating bonds, shares of stock, commercial paper, bills of lading and
the like, it is engaged in "producing goods for commerce" . . . . On the
other hand the mere writing of letters or the drawing of papers, which have
no value of their own except as records, are not to be counted.
Id. at 789-90.
"439 F.2d 340 (4th Cir. 1971) (hereinafter Falk).
"1d. at 348.
7
In an effort to refine a meaning for "articles or subjects of commerce," a federal
district court applied a rule of statutory construction to the definition of "goods":
By application of the familiar construction rule of ejusdem generis,
"articles or subjects of commerce" fall into the same class as goods, wares,
products, commodities, and merchandise, in the sense that they are articles of trade, capable of being reduced to possession and retained for
commercial purposes, or transmuted into a form of service, or exchanged
or sold in the commercial world . . ..
It is not enough that goods exist as a result of the productive processes. They must be goods of commerce, or wares of commerce, or
merchandise of commerce after they have been produced.
Young v. Kellex Corp., 82 F. Supp. 953, 961 (E.D. Tenn. 1948).
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Many decisions have required an element of intrinsic value for an item
to come within the definition of "goods" in the Act. Another quality often
required, but not demanded by the court in Travis-Edwards, is that the
item have some purpose outside the business framework.7 ' The effect of
the decision in Travis-Edwards with respect to coverage under the "production of goods for commerce" test is to widen the range of the Act's
application on this basis.
Conclusion
Travis-Edwards and Welcome Wagon clearly represent a conflict between the Fifth and Third Circuits as to the meaning of "engaging in
commerce or the production of goods for commerce" as a basis for
coverage under the Fair Labor Standards Act. The Fifth Circuit maintains that the use of the mails in the conduct of a local activity is sufficient
to qualify employees for coverage, while the Third Circuit takes the
opposite position. Analysis of similar cases and other relevant authorities
conveys the impression that the Third Circuit supports the more widely
held position, that is, that such reports as those in question are too far
removed from interstate commerce to apply the Fair Labor Standards
Act.
Howevever, coverage has been expanded in many sections of the Act
with the 1961 and 1966 amendments. Perhaps, then, an extension of the
concept of "engaging in commerce or in the production of goods for
commerce" would now be appropriate. Since all businesses of any consequence must use the mails, coverage would be extended to virtually every
enterprise not specifically exempted. Such a change in policy would also
relieve the courts of attempting to make distinctions on the basis of minor
differences in facts. Thus, while the Fifth Circuit's decision in TravisEdwards seems novel in view of previous cases, the general adoption of
this holding would result in wider access to the benefits of the Act and
alleviate the administrative problems of applying its terms. Perhaps a
more appropriate method to extend the scope of the Act would be for
Congress to make specific changes in the statutory language.
GLENN
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MOORE

"Stevens v. Welcome Wagon Int'l, Inc., 390 F.2d 75 (3rd Cir. 1968); Billeaudeau v.
Temple Associates, Inc., 213 F.2d 707 (5th Cir. 1954), cerl. denied, 348 U.S. 959 (1955);
Bozant v. Bank of N.Y., 156 F.2d 787 (2nd Cir. 1946).

